Court finds that Coyote president/founder’s blog post and director of operation’s Facebook status update could qualify as “adverse action” against employees for purposes of FLSA retaliation claimsStewart v. CUS Nashville, LLC,  2013 WL 456482 (M.D.Tenn. Feb. 6, 2013)

We’ve seen cases  where employees were disciplined or fired for venting online (see posts here and here).  But what about when the employer does the venting?  That can create legal problems as well.

Employees of different bars in the well-known Coyote Ugly Saloon franchise filed a class action against corporate entities related to the franchise and Coyote Ugly’s president and founder, Liliana Lovell.  The lawsuit claimed violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  One of the plaintiffs (Stewart), claims that her employer retaliated against her shortly after the lawsuit was filed.  The alleged retaliation came in the form of this entry on Lovell’s “Lil Spills” blog, which appears on Coyote Ugly’s website:

“By the way Lil, you should be getting served with a lawsuit. No worries just sign for it”. This particular case will end up pissing me off cause it is coming from someone we terminated for theft. I have to believe in my heart that somewhere down the road, bad people end up facing bad circumstances!
I have been reading the basics of Buddhism and am going to a class on Monday. The Buddhist way would be to find beauty in the situation and release anger knowing that peace will come. Obviously , I am still a very new Buddhist cause my thoughts are ” fuck that bitch”. Let me do my breathing exercises and see if any of my thoughts change. Lol

Stewart claimed that the entry falsely accused of her theft.

A second employee (Stone), claimed that Coyote Ugly’s Director of Operations (Huckaby) made the following post to his Facebook page: “Dear God, please don’t let me kill the girl that is suing me .… that is all …..”  Huckaby was intoxicated when he made this post.  According to Stone, Huckaby was sitting across the bar from her when he made the post.  Stone, who at the time was Facebook friends with Huckaby, saw the post on her phone almost an hour later, but the post was removed the next day.  Huckaby did not remember making or removing the Facebook post.

Stone further claimed that Huckaby made retaliatory comments the next night after learning that a customer threatened to sue after falling down some stairs.  Huckaby allegedly said: “Why does everyone sue?  I’m tired of all these bi***es taking their issues out on our company.  They’re f***ing idiots.”  Huckaby made the statements while Stone was approximately two feet away.  Stone quit her job the next day.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the two individual retaliation claims.  One of the issues relating to Stewart’s claim was whether the Lil Spills blog entry was an “adverse action.”  A plaintiff claiming retaliation “must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action material adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”  Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. V. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).  Applying that standard, the court found that a blog entry written by the employer’s founder and president accusing an employee of theft could constitute an adverse action.  A jury could find that the blog entry would have likely dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a FLSA claim.  Because genuine issues of material fact existed, the court denied summary judgment on Stewart’s retaliation claim.

Similarly, factual issues precluded summary judgment on Stone’s retaliation claim.  The court found that a reasonable person could find that Huckaby’s Facebook post was directed at Stone given that he knew she had joined the lawsuit and had made the post while seated across from her at the bar.  The Facebook post, together with the comments Huckaby made the following night, could be reasonably construed as the employer’s official hostility toward employees who bring lawsuits against it.  The court found that a reasonable person in Stone’s situation would have felt compelled to resign.  On the flip side, the court also denied Stone’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim because there were factual disputes over Huckaby’s state of mind.  There was no evidence that Huckaby mentioned the lawsuit or Stone’s name while making either of the statements, and it was undisputed that he was drinking in both instances.

LegalTXTS Lesson: Authenticity can be an important part of a company’s brand or social engagement strategy, but sometimes a company’s self-expression can go too far.  As this case illustrates, even stray remarks can have legal consequences.  Like employees, employers need to exercise good judgment when posting content online.  Complaining about employees on the Internet rarely constitutes good judgment.  This is especially true if managers are connected to their subordinates on the same social network and therefore share content with each other.

Check out the article on Internet firings posted on HR Hero’s “Technology for HR” blog.  The article talks about the firing of the Applebee’s waitress who snapped a picture of a receipt on which the customer,  a pastor, wrote: “I give God 10%  Why do you get 18?”  and posted it on Reddit.  I was happy to provide commentary for the article on Applebee’s social media policy and suggest tips for employers dealing with embarrassing Internet activity of employees like the Applebee’s incident.

A New York federal judge rules that misuse of computer information  gained through legal access does not violate the CFAAAdvanced Aerofoil Techs., AG v. Todaro, 2013 WL 410873 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013)

Judge Carter of the Southern District of New York joined a growing number of federal courts adopting a narrow interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) that precludes liability for misappropriation under the Act.  Several high-level personnel in the plaintiff companies (AAT) defected to a competing company, apparently taking with them AAT’s confidential and proprietary technology.  AAT sued the ex-employees for, among other things, alleged violations of the CFAA.

An obstacle that AAT faced in pressing the CFAA claim was the fact that the ex-employees had “unfettered and unlimited access” to the information they took with them.  Liability under the CFAA requires that the defendant have “access[ed] a computer without authorization.”  Courts across the country are split on whether the CFAA is violated where a person legally accesses to a computer but misuses the information obtained with such access, such as what the former AAT employers allegedly did.

After noting that the Second Circuit has not decided the issue, and surveying decisions on both sides of the issue, including those written by his colleagues in the same district, Judge Carter answered the question in the negative.  A CFAA violation occurs when one accesses a computer without permission.  Judge Carter gave three reasons for his conclusion.  First, the ordinary meaning of the word “authorization” refers to the absence of permission.  Second, the legislative history of the CFAA indicates that the Act is directed primarily at access instead of misuse.  Third, a violation of the CFAA could lead to criminal liability, the statute should be read narrowly, and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant.  Because AAT had not revoked the defendants’ unlimited access to its system when they siphoned off the confidential and proprietary information, the court dismissed the CFAA claim.

LegalTXTS Note: I’ve blogged on this issue quite a bit.  That indicates increased use of the CFAA in data misappropriation cases, or the uneasiness courts have in stretching the CFAA beyond its origin as an anti-hacking statute–or both.  Here are my previous posts on similar cases.

Court Carves Back Oracle’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Claim Against Gray Market Reseller

CFAA: Recent Cases

One Is Not Like the Other: Access vs. Use Restrictions Under the CFAA

Don’t Just Because You Can

NLRB Strikes Down Restrictions on Employee Communications on Social Media and Elsewhere — DirectTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 359 NLRB 54 (Jan. 25, 2013)

On the same day that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were unconstitutional, the NLRB struck down several of DirectTV’s work rules, including one relating to social media use.  The ruling comes as little surprise, as it mirrors the positions and rationale stated in previous Guidance Memoranda issued by the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel.  Of course, this decision carries more weight because it’s issued by the Board itself (but query the ruling’s validity in light of the D.C. Circuit decision).

Restrictions on employee communication with the media

The first two rules instructed employees to “not contact the media,” and “not contact or comment to any media about the company unless pre-authorized by Public Relations.”  Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employee communications with the media concerning labor disputes.  The broad and unequivocal language of the rules could lead an employee to believe that such protected activity is not permitted under the rules, which is unlawful, the NLRB.  The rules did not distinguish between protected and unprotected communications (e.g., maliciously false statements).

Restrictions on employee communication with NRLB agents

The next rule in question stated: “If law enforcement wants to interview or obtain information regarding a DIRECTV employee, whether in person or by telephone/email, the employee should contact the security department . . . who will handle contact with law enforcement agencies and any needed coordination with DIRECTV departments.”  The NLRB found that this rule would make employees think that they must go through their employer before cooperating with an NLRB investigation, as NLRB agents could reasonably be considered “law enforcement” as far as labor matters are concerned.  This violates Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which protects employees who file unfair labor practice charges or who provide information in the course of an NLRB investigation.  While an employer could have a legitimate interest in knowing about attempts by law enforcement agents to interview employees, the rule failed to separate out those situations from those in which the Section 8(a)(4) protections apply.

Confidentiality

DirecTV instructed employees to “[n]ever discuss details about your job, company business or work projects with anyone outside the company” and to “[n]ever give out information about customers or DIRECTV employees.”  The rule identified “employee records” as one of the categories of “company information” that must be kept confidential.  The NLRB struck down these rules because employees could reasonably understand them to restrict discussion of their wages and other terms of conditions of employment.  The rule was also deficient in not exempting protected communications with third parties such as union representatives, NLRB agents, or other governmental agencies concerned with workplace matters.

Online Disclosures of “Company Information”

DirecTV posted a corporate policy on its intranet stating: “Employees may not blog, enter chat rooms, post messages on public websites or otherwise disclose company information that is not already disclosed as a public record.”  In addition to the policies on the intranet, DirecTV issued a handbook with overlapping sets of rules governing employee conduct and effectively directed employees to read them as one.  The handbook contains a confidentiality rule that defines “company information” as including “employee records.”  Reading the two policies together, an employee could understand the intranet policy to prohibit online disclosure of information concerning wages, discipline, and performance ratings.

LegalTXT NotesThis ruling isn’t groundbreaking, but it confirms that the Board agrees with the positions taken in the previous OGC Guidance Memoranda on social media policies.  The D.C. Circuit does cast a pall over the validity of this ruling, although the NLRB supported the ruling with multiple Board decisions that were issued well before the recess appointments were made.