NLRB Strikes Down Restrictions on Employee Communications on Social Media and Elsewhere — DirectTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 359 NLRB 54 (Jan. 25, 2013)

On the same day that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were unconstitutional, the NLRB struck down several of DirectTV’s work rules, including one relating to social media use.  The ruling comes as little surprise, as it mirrors the positions and rationale stated in previous Guidance Memoranda issued by the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel.  Of course, this decision carries more weight because it’s issued by the Board itself (but query the ruling’s validity in light of the D.C. Circuit decision).

Restrictions on employee communication with the media

The first two rules instructed employees to “not contact the media,” and “not contact or comment to any media about the company unless pre-authorized by Public Relations.”  Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employee communications with the media concerning labor disputes.  The broad and unequivocal language of the rules could lead an employee to believe that such protected activity is not permitted under the rules, which is unlawful, the NLRB.  The rules did not distinguish between protected and unprotected communications (e.g., maliciously false statements).

Restrictions on employee communication with NRLB agents

The next rule in question stated: “If law enforcement wants to interview or obtain information regarding a DIRECTV employee, whether in person or by telephone/email, the employee should contact the security department . . . who will handle contact with law enforcement agencies and any needed coordination with DIRECTV departments.”  The NLRB found that this rule would make employees think that they must go through their employer before cooperating with an NLRB investigation, as NLRB agents could reasonably be considered “law enforcement” as far as labor matters are concerned.  This violates Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which protects employees who file unfair labor practice charges or who provide information in the course of an NLRB investigation.  While an employer could have a legitimate interest in knowing about attempts by law enforcement agents to interview employees, the rule failed to separate out those situations from those in which the Section 8(a)(4) protections apply.

Confidentiality

DirecTV instructed employees to “[n]ever discuss details about your job, company business or work projects with anyone outside the company” and to “[n]ever give out information about customers or DIRECTV employees.”  The rule identified “employee records” as one of the categories of “company information” that must be kept confidential.  The NLRB struck down these rules because employees could reasonably understand them to restrict discussion of their wages and other terms of conditions of employment.  The rule was also deficient in not exempting protected communications with third parties such as union representatives, NLRB agents, or other governmental agencies concerned with workplace matters.

Online Disclosures of “Company Information”

DirecTV posted a corporate policy on its intranet stating: “Employees may not blog, enter chat rooms, post messages on public websites or otherwise disclose company information that is not already disclosed as a public record.”  In addition to the policies on the intranet, DirecTV issued a handbook with overlapping sets of rules governing employee conduct and effectively directed employees to read them as one.  The handbook contains a confidentiality rule that defines “company information” as including “employee records.”  Reading the two policies together, an employee could understand the intranet policy to prohibit online disclosure of information concerning wages, discipline, and performance ratings.

LegalTXT NotesThis ruling isn’t groundbreaking, but it confirms that the Board agrees with the positions taken in the previous OGC Guidance Memoranda on social media policies.  The D.C. Circuit does cast a pall over the validity of this ruling, although the NLRB supported the ruling with multiple Board decisions that were issued well before the recess appointments were made.

No First Amendment Protection for public school teacher’s comments on Facebook — In re O’Brien, 2013 WL 132508 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jan 11, 2013)

We’ve seen a number of cases in which employees are fired for making comments on Facebook that they never thought would get around. (For a sampling, see my posts on Sutton v. Bailey, the BMW dealership decision, and Sumien v. Careflite.)  Put In re O’Brien in this category of cases, except add a twist: Here, the employer is a public school district.  Does the First Amendment (which applies only to government action) add a layer of protection to comments posted by a public employee on social media?  Not in this case.

Jennifer O’Brien was a first-grade schoolteacher.  O’Brien posted two statements on Facebook:

I’m not a teacher—I’m a warden for future criminals!

And the second:

They had a scared straight program in school—why couldn’t [I] bring [first] graders?

The Facebook comments were brought to the attention of the principal at O’Brien’s school (Ortiz).  Ortiz was “appalled” by the statements.  O’Brien’s Facebook comments also spread quickly throughout the school district, causing a well-publicized uproar.

The school district charged O’Brien with conduct unbecoming of a teacher.  An administrative law judge (ALJ) found support for the charge and recommended O’Brien’s removal from her tenured position, and the acting commissioner of the school district agreed.  The ALJ was particularly bothered by O’Brien’s lack of remorse in posting the comments.  A New Jersey court adopted with the reasoning of the ALJ on appeal.

Both at the administrative level and on appeal, O’Brien argued that the First Amendment protected her Facebook statements.  The court disagreed, applying the test stated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education that analyzes whether a public employee’s statements are protected by the First Amendment by balancing the employee’s interest, “as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

The court accepted the findings of the ALJ and Commissioner that O’Brien’s real motivation for making the statements was her dissatisfaction with her job and the conduct of some of her students, not a desire to comment on “matters of public concern.”  Even if the comments regarded a matter of public concern, O’Brien’s right to express those comments was outweighed by the school district’s interest in the efficient operation of its schools.  The court also rejected O’Brien’s arguments that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge against her, and that removal was an inappropriate penalty.

LegalTXTS Lesson: Public employers need to exercise more caution when disciplining employees for their activity on social media networks.  Unlike the private sector, public agencies are limited by the First Amendment when regulating expression of their employees.  But even public employees don’t have absolute freedom to say whatever they want.  As O’Brien reminds us, when public employees make comments of a personal nature, or their comments interfere with the delivery of government services, such expression is not protected by the First Amendment.

Sutton v. Bailey, 2012 WL 5990291 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012), is the latest reminder that private Facebook postings can lead to professional consequences.   Sutton was hired as a Funeral Science Director at Arkansas State University–Mountain Home for the 2010-11 academic year.  His employment contract provided that he could be terminated at any time “for adequate cause.”  A month after Sutton got hired (but apparently before he began teaching), he posted on his Facebook page: “Toby Sutton hopes this teaching gig works out.  Guess I shouldn’t have cheated through mortuary school and faked people out.  Crap!”

University officials somehow learned about the post and asked to meet with Sutton about it.  At the meeting, the university’s vice-chancellor (Bailey) and director of instruction (Thomas) confronted Sutton with the post.  He admitted to making the post.  Bailey then told Sutton that he was fired.  Sutton asked if it mattered that the statement was a joke, and that he posted the statement before he began teaching.  Baily replied “no” to both questions.  Sutton then received an Employee Counseling Statement form stating that he was being dismissed for an incident of “Academic Fraud and unprofessional conduct.”  The “Supervisor Statement” portion of the form explained: “Mr. Sutton posted material on Facebook indicating he had ‘cheated’ his way through mortuary school.  There are multiple other class related issues.”  Bailey told Sutton he had an opportunity to make a statement before signing the form.  Sutton declined and signed the form without further comment.  Sutton later sued Bailey and Thomas in their individual capacities, alleging that he was deprived of procedural due process in connection with his firing.

The bulk of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion addressed the defendants’ defense of qualified immunity, which the court found to have merit.

LegalTXT Lesson: This case has two important, if obvious, takeaways.  First, employees need to remember that whatever content they share on their private social media networks could come back to haunt them professionally.  Employees need to be reminded constantly that social media blurs the line between personal and public, private and professional.

Second, Sutton answers a question I often get asked by employers: Can employees be disciplined or even terminated for their private social media conduct?  The answer is yes.  (For another example, read my post on the Careflite case, which recently settled).  There are limits, of course (and the NLRB Acting General Counsel has waxed long about many of them), but there are circumstances in which it is proper to discipline or terminate an employee for his or her private social media activity.  Now, it would help greatly if an employer sets standards of employee conduct clearly identifying the kinds of social media conduct that could lead to adverse employment action.  We don’t know what was in the employee handbook of the university in this case, but a rule that could’ve come in handy is one instructing faculty members not to endorse or make light of academic dishonesty.

Not knowing others can see your Facebook comments doesn’t mean you can sue for invasion of privacy. —  Sumien v. Careflite, 2012 WL 2579525 (Tex. Ct. App. July 5, 2012)

This case goes into the category of “what you don’t know can hurt you.”  Two emergency medical technicians (Sumien and Roberts) had an exchange on the Facebook wall of another co-worker in which they made derogatory comments about a patient they had transported via ambulance.  Haynes, the sister of a compliance officer of employer of the two technicians (CareFlite), saw Roberts’ comments and was offended.  Haynes notified her sister (Calvert), who had access to the comments because she was Facebook friends with Roberts.  After Haynes complained to the management of CareFlite, Sumien and Roberts were terminated.  They sued CareFlite for unlawful termination and invasion of privacy.  The trial court granted summary judgment to CareFlite on all claims, and one of the technicians (Sumien) appealed.  The only issue in the appeal was whether the trial court should have granted summary judgment on the intrusion upon seclusion claim.

One of the requirements of an “intrusion into seclusion” claim is, unsurprisingly, an intentional intrusion into the seclusion or private affairs of another.  Sumien argued that CareFlite intruded upon his seclusion because one of its employees read his comments.  Sumien claimed to be unaware that Roberts’ Facebook friends (including Calvert) could see the comments he posted on Roberts’ wall.  Too bad, said the court.  The comments were visible to the Roberts’ friends, and so there was no intrusion into a private matter.

LegalTXTS Lesson: Know your privacy settings, and think through who could see what you share in the social media space.  This seems rather obvious, but then again, there are those who don’t do this and then claim their privacy is invaded.  The other point is that a intrusion into seclusion claim based on material posted on a social media network probably is difficult to win.  Some courts, like the one who ordered Twitter to comply with a subpoena last week, simply don’t regard posts on social media private at all.